


















As a result of the above proposals, Parliament enacted s63(1) SOA, which provides:

‘A person commits an offence if –
(a)	he is a trespasser on any premises,
(b)	he intends to commit a relevant sexual offence on the premises, and 
(c)	he knows that, or is reckless as to whether, he is a trespasser.’ 

There are several clear advantages to this offence. As a preparatory offence, it permits intervention at an early stage, including circumstances where a relevant attempt has not yet occurred. It also reflects the defendant’s sexual motivation (and thus subsequent management as a sex offender). It is wider, and thus more protective in its scope than the previous offence of burglary with intent to rape, as it extends to ‘any premises’ and incorporates the intent to commit a ‘relevant sexual offence’.

An interesting illustration of the scope and operation of the s63 offence occurred in Pacurar (Adrian), 2016.​[3]​ 

Facts of Pacurar 
 
D entered the victims’ remote farmhouse as a trespasser. He was naked and touching his penis. The householders (Mr & Mrs Park) and their two young children (a baby and a toddler aged two-and-a half) were present. Mr Park restrained the D, who continued to touch his own penis, made offensive remarks and at one stage inserted his thumb in his own anus. The police were called and D was subsequently arrested. D appealed against his conviction for an offence contrary to s63, arguing firstly that the prosecution should have specified a specific intended sexual offence, and secondly that the trial judge should have directed the jury that it had to agree on the specific sexual offence intended.​[4]​

The Appeal
In dismissing the appeal, the Court of Appeal gave consideration to the degree of particularity that was required to be established in an offence under s63.  
Firstly, it was recognised that there were very many potential offences created by Part 1 of the SOA. However, the Particulars of the Offence, and the way in which the case had been presented to the jury, did not fail for lack of particularity.  The prosecution had narrowed down the possible offences (which it was alleged D may have intended to commit) to sections 1-3 and sections 5-7 of the SOA. Moreover, and importantly, it was clear that the intended offences would have been committed against a specified (and quite small) group of individuals, at a specific time and place. The trial judge had correctly directed the jury on what had to be proven, including the different criteria that would apply if the victim had been a child.​[5]​  
Secondly, the CA rejected the associated ground of appeal, relating to whether the jury must agree on the sexual offence intended by the D:

“It would not matter that some of the jurors were satisfied the appellant intended to commit an assault on Mr Park and some that he intended to commit a more serious offence, provided that they were all agreed that the ingredients of the offence were made out, namely that he trespassed with the intent to commit a relevant sexual offence”.​[6]​  

Conclusions
The decision of the CA is useful for clarifying a number of issues relating to the offence under s63.
Firstly, it is clear that the trial judge should direct the jury so that it can agree that D trespassed on premises (with the requisite mens rea of knowing or being reckless as to trespass), and that he intended to commit a relevant sexual offence. In the instant case it is suggested that D’s own actions and the surrounding circumstances provide clear evidence from which an intention to commit a relevant sexual offence could properly be inferred. In other instances, intention may be found from what D did or said, or by reference to items he had in his possession. 

Secondly, the precise way in which the prosecution presents its case will vary according to the specific circumstances:
“There will be many cases where the evidence points to a specific sexual offence and the Crown will be in a position to make clear what is alleged …. However, there will be other cases, and this is one, where the prosecution alleges it is obvious from all the circumstances that the defendant intended to commit a sexual offence but it is impossible to specify precisely which one and upon whom …”. ​[7]​

Again, this is an important consideration. On the facts of Pacurar, the prosecution narrowed the possible offences in two ways: they identified six potential offences/sections, and identified those offences as being against a specified group of individuals at a specific time and venue. That was not bad for lack of particularity, and thus did not make the conviction unsafe. 
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